Yet philosophical discourse is required in order to eliminate philosophical discourse. We know this Skeptical philosophical dis¬ course thanks to Sextus Empiricus, a physician who wrote at the end of the second century A.D. Sextus also gives us precious information on the history of the Skeptic movement. The Skeptics considered Pyrrho the model of the Skeptic way of life.
Aenesidemus taught that everything is mixed with and related to everything else, which made it impossible to perceive things all by themselves, and finally that the senses are the source of illusion. Agrippa, another Skeptic later than Aenesidemus, proposed five other arguments against the dogmatic logicians: philosophers contradict one another; in order to prove something, it is necessary to continue to infinity, construct a vicious circle, or postulate undemonstrable principles in an unfounded way; ultimately, all things are relative; all things presuppose everything else; and it is impossible to know them either separately or in their totality.
This philosophical discourse leads to epokhe, or the suspension of our adherence to dogmatic philosophical discourse, including Skeptical discourse, which, like a purgative, evacuates itself along with the humors whose evacuation it provokes. Andre-Jean Voelke rightly compares this attitude to that of Wittgenstein, who, at the end of the Tractatus, rejects the propositions of the Tractatus like a ladder which has become useless. Likewise, Wittgenstein opposes philosophy as pathology to philosophy as a cure.
What is left after this elimination of philosophy by philosophy?
Only a way of life. Life itself, everyday life as everyone leads it. This is to be the Skeptic’s rule of life: simply to utilize his natural resources – his senses and intelligence – just as lay people do. We are to conform to the customs, laws, and institutions of our country, and follow our natural tendencies and dispositions – eat when we are hungry, drink when we are thirsty. Was this a naive return to simplicity? Perhaps; but the philosopher in question was anything but naive.
Since the Skeptic was convinced that it is impossible to know whether one thing or event is better than another thing or event, he would enjoy firmly established peace of mind, thanks to his suspension of all value judgments on things. Such suspension would diminish his pain and suffering, should he ever have to face them, because it would prevent him from adding to his suffering or setbacks the agonizing thought that what he is experiencing is an evil. In everything he did, he was to limit himself to describing what he experienced, without adding anything about what things are or what they are worth. He was to be content to describe the sensory representations he had, and to enunciate the state of his sensory apparatus, without adding to it his opinion.
Like the Epicureans and the Stoics, moreover, the Skeptics used short, striking sayings to renew their choice of life at each moment. Some examples are: “This is no better than that:’ “Perhaps;’ “All is indeterminate,” “Everything escapes comprehension:’ “Every argument is opposed by an equal argument,” “I suspend my judgment.” As we can see, the Skeptic way of life also required exercises of thought and the will; and it was a choice of life based on the elimination of philosophical discourse.
Source: What is Ancient Philosophy?