The fourth chapter of Fateful Triangle discusses the historical backgrounds of Israel and Palestine.
The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by Israel marked a contentious chapter in the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, challenging the ideological foundation of their alliance. Despite this, the U.S.’s commitment to ensuring Israel’s military superiority and financial support for settlement activities in occupied territories remained unaltered, potentially obstructing any peaceful resolution to the Israel-Arab conflict. The events of 1982 underscored the complexity of this relationship, highlighting a steadfast U.S. support that could further embolden aggressive postures in the region.
The historical backdrop of the Arab-Jewish conflict is essential for understanding these dynamics. The indigenous Arab population’s resistance to the Zionist project and the establishment of a Jewish state was rooted in a profound sense of dispossession and exclusion from decisions regarding their homeland. This resistance was often framed negatively within American discourse, ignoring the legitimate grievances of the Palestinian Arabs. The narrative surrounding the Balfour Declaration and subsequent British and international policies illustrates a dismissive attitude towards the Arab population’s rights and aspirations, further complicating the path to a peaceful settlement.
Efforts by the Palestinian Arabs to assert their right to self-determination and resist dispossession were met with violence and political marginalization. The 1936-1939 nationalist revolt, crushed by the British, and the broader historical context of these struggles, reveal a persistent pattern of disregard for the indigenous population’s aspirations. Post-World War II, the plight of Jewish displaced persons and the strategic maneuvers of the Zionist movement underscored a complex interplay of humanitarian concerns and political objectives, often at the expense of addressing the fundamental injustices at the heart of the conflict.
Understanding these layered historical narratives is crucial for grasping the current impasse and the challenges that lie ahead in achieving a just and lasting peace in the region. The legacy of these events continues to influence the political and social dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict, underscoring the importance of acknowledging and addressing the deep-seated grievances and rights of all parties involved.
In 1948, the refusal of American Jewish leaders to consider allowing Holocaust survivors the choice of emigration destinations, including the United States, instead of solely focusing on Palestine, sparked criticism and accusations of hypocrisy and betrayal from within their own community. This issue remains sensitive, evidenced by the dissension within a private commission led by Arthur Goldberg in the 1980s, tasked with examining the actions of Jewish organizations during the Holocaust. The commission’s work was marred by internal conflict and a lack of consensus on whether more lives could have been saved through more assertive actions by American Jewish leaders. A draft report criticized established Zionist organizations for prioritizing the creation of a Jewish state over immediate rescue efforts, suggesting this focus diverted attention from potential rescue plans. The debate over the prioritization of political and ideological goals over urgent rescue operations reflects broader questions about the responsibilities and strategies of Jewish leadership in the face of the Holocaust. The historical context highlights a pivotal moment when the Zionist movement officially endorsed the goal of establishing a Jewish state, a decision that preceded full awareness of the Nazi’s Final Solution, and underscores the complexity of balancing immediate humanitarian needs against long-term political aspirations.
In November 1947, the UN proposed the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, accepted by the Zionist movement except for extremist factions. The Arabs, nearly unanimously, rejected this, leading to civil strife marked by terror from both sides. A notable early incident involved the Haganah attacking the village of Khissas, killing 10 Arabs, which may have escalated the conflict. By May 1948, with the establishment of Israel, Jewish forces had expanded into areas designated for the Arab state, partly prompting Arab flight through acts like the Deir Yassin massacre, where around 250 people were killed by Irgun and LEHI forces, including women and children, exacerbating the exodus of Arabs.
The official founding of Israel prompted the entry of Arab state armies, with the ensuing war mostly fought over areas meant for the Palestinian state. This conflict resulted in further partition, with Israel and Jordan dividing the territories meant for Palestinians, leading to about 700,000 Palestinians fleeing or being expelled. While it was long claimed that Palestinians fled on Arab leaders’ orders, research suggests flight was mainly due to Israeli military actions and fear, a pattern that continued in later conflicts, including during the 1956 and 1967 wars, with Israel often using the threat of expulsion as a political tool.
The criticism of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank often ignores that both Jordan and Israel acted upon a secret agreement to partition Palestine in 1947-48, sidelining the Palestinian leadership. This secret pact caused internal conflicts within Israel’s ranks and is part of the reason the Arab states entered the war, partly to counter King Abdullah’s ambitions. Abdullah’s assassination in 1951 is frequently cited as evidence of Palestinian opposition to any form of moderation towards Israel, yet this overlooks the broader context of the Israeli-Jordanian plans against a Palestinian state. Nahum Goldmann, critical of Israeli diplomacy and the exploitation of the Holocaust for political gains, emphasized the moral indefensibility of such actions and advocated for a changed approach towards Arabs. His death in 1982 was met with silence from the Israeli government, contrasting with condolences from PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, highlighting the contentious nature of internal Zionist discourse and external perceptions of it.
The narrative surrounding Israel’s wars often portrays them as defensive actions against Arab aggression. However, the 1982 Lebanon invasion marked the first time Israel initiated conflict without facing an immediate threat to its existence, challenging the typical portrayal of Israel as a passive victim. Prior conflicts, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1978 Lebanon invasion, also contradict the notion of purely defensive wars. The 1967 Six-Day War is frequently cited as a justified preemptive strike against an imminent Egyptian attack, yet high-ranking Israeli officials have acknowledged there was no immediate threat to Israel’s existence. This narrative simplifies complex situations and overlooks Israeli provocations and territorial expansions that contributed to escalating tensions. The portrayal of these conflicts in Western discourse often omits these nuances, maintaining a one-sided perspective on Israel’s military history.
Following the Suez Crisis, the New York Times incorrectly reported on an Egyptian threat based on a distorted interview with Nasser, contributing to a false narrative of Egyptian aggression. Israeli forces committed severe atrocities in Gaza, including mass killings and looting, with reports of civilian deaths in Khan Yunis and Rafah and harsh treatment by Israeli troops. Despite Israeli claims of “refugee resistance,” evidence suggests minimal to no resistance. The behavior of Israeli occupying forces, often glorified for their “purity of arms,” reflects a broader pattern of occupying armies committing atrocities. Tensions in the demilitarized zones, partly due to Israeli encroachments for water diversion and agricultural development, led to conflicts with Syria. Israeli provocations, including settlement in areas farmed by Palestinians, contributed to retaliatory shelling from the Golan Heights. The 1967 conquest of the Golan Heights, justified by Syrian shelling, and subsequent actions toward annexation ignored the potential for negotiated settlement and overlooked Arab fears of Israeli aggression from the Heights.
Post-1967, Israel’s Labor government integrated occupied territories into Israel, annexing East Jerusalem and settling in the West Bank and Golan Heights. Massive Arab land expropriation and settlement conversion occurred, employing Arab citizens in Jewish enterprises. Settlements, aimed at establishing permanent rule and breaking Arab territorial continuity, were not motivated by security but political facts on the ground. Despite international law restricting settlement to military necessity, Israeli policy pursued settlement for “political faits accomplis,” envisioning extensive Jewish presence from the Golan to Sinai and within the West Bank, reflecting a strategic reshaping of territorial control and demographic composition.
Israel’s settlement and industrial development in the territories, including the Golan, West Bank, Gaza, and northeastern Sinai, involved severe displacement and exploitation of native populations. The city of Yamit’s creation led to the expulsion of thousands and destruction of their communities. Despite these actions, Israeli government figures and public largely ignored or rationalized the consequences. The international reaction, particularly in the United States, was minimal or supportive, overshadowed by admiration for Israel’s development efforts, with criticisms dismissed or marginalized. This pattern of settlement, displacement, and rationalization illustrates the broader issues of land use, national identity, and conflict in the region, highlighting the complexities and human costs involved in these policies.
Under Begin and Reagan, Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories accelerated, supported by a change in U.S. policy which deemed West Bank settlements “legal.” This led to extensive land expropriation, aiming to create a “dual society” with Jewish urban centers and Arab ghettos, severely constraining Palestinian development and freedoms. The Reagan Peace Plan’s call for a settlement freeze contradicted the practical support for Israel’s expansion through increased U.S. aid, signaling tacit approval of annexation efforts. Despite public criticism, this expansion was facilitated by U.S. financial support and a lack of genuine diplomatic pressure to halt settlement activities, undermining arguments for Israeli withdrawal based on democratic principles or U.S. opposition.
The U.S. Congress increased aid to Israel, even converting some loans to grants, seen as a victory for Israel, particularly after the West Beirut massacres. This support for Israel’s militarization and expansion was contrary to protests within Israel itself. The moral argument for Israel’s policies focuses on consequences for Jews, not the conquered population, reflecting a common stance among liberal Zionists. Israeli support for regimes in Latin America, regardless of their human rights abuses, exemplifies a foreign policy guided by what is deemed “good for the Jews.” Critics within Israel face condemnation for voicing dissent abroad, highlighting a culture that discourages external critique of Israeli government policies, especially in the context of U.S. financial support.
Reagan’s peace proposal was rejected by the Begin government, which announced plans for new settlements, continuing a policy of unilateral implementation. The Labor Party, despite superficial support for Reagan’s proposals, shared with Likud a rejection of a Palestinian state and differed only on the manner of settlement expansion. The Labor strategy aimed to avoid the “demographic problem” by relocating Arabs and intensifying Jewish settlements, ensuring areas like the Jordan Valley and Golan Heights remained under Israeli control. This approach, backed by American financial and diplomatic support, has led to the West Bank’s economy being undeveloped, stagnant, and dependent on Israel, serving as a captive market for Israeli goods and a source of cheap labor. Israel’s policies, enabled by U.S. support, are critiqued as imperialistic, with the international community’s objections often vetoed by the U.S. in the UN, underscoring the diplomatic protection afforded to Israel similar to other U.S.-backed regimes.
The consensus among Israel’s major political groups, supported by U.S. policies, does not signal a shift in the approach to the occupied territories, potentially extending similar policies to southern Lebanon. Internal opposition within Israel to settlement policies has been ineffective, largely due to the lack of U.S. opposition. Reagan’s endorsement of settlements encouraged a significant expansion in the territories, with varied groups, including Histadrut Labor Union and religious factions, contributing to the settlement efforts. This has led to virtual annexation, with resources focused on settlement expansion. The “demographic problem” faced by Israel due to these policies hints at a preference for population transfer, with historical suggestions from both the Labor and Likud parties favoring relocation of Arabs. This perspective, rooted in Zionist thought, disregards the indigenous population’s attachment to their land, viewing their relocation as a solution to maintaining a Jewish state. This stance reflects a broader, historically consistent view within Zionist ideology that the land of Israel is fundamentally for the Jewish people, with Arab presence being a temporary or removable obstacle.
The 1967 war led to internal shifts in Israel, increasing reliance on force, and changes in the socio-political landscape, notably affecting the labor force and attitudes towards the Labor Alignment. The Sephardic majority, historically marginalized by the Labor-associated Ashkenazi elite, largely rallied behind Begin’s aggressive policies, reflecting deeper socio-economic divides. The 1981 elections highlighted the working class’s alienation from Labor, with the kibbutzim, perceived as symbols of Ashkenazi privilege and exploitation, becoming focal points of resentment. This disillusionment was exacerbated by the stark contrasts in wealth and living conditions, leading to a significant portion of the Oriental Jewish working class favoring Likud, which they felt represented their interests better than the traditionally dominant Labor. The discontent was not only due to economic disparities but also cultural and managerial dominance by Ashkenazim in labor and resettlement contexts, deepening the divide and shifting political allegiances towards Likud, reflecting a broader rejection of Labor’s elitism and perceived disregard for Sephardic communities’ socio-cultural identity and economic welfare.
The deep-seated resentment and division between Oriental Jews and the Labor Alignment, perceived as the continuation of Mapai, are rooted in cultural, economic, and social disparities. Oriental Jews felt marginalized and culturally denigrated by the Ashkenazi-dominated Labor, likening their treatment to that of Arabs in Gaza. This alienation intensified with the preferential treatment of Russian immigrants, exacerbating existing inequalities. Tamar Maroz’s exploration into the Oriental communities’ sentiments reveals a stark dichotomy: Begin and Likud are revered as messianic, people-centric, and anti-establishment, whereas Labor is viewed as elitist, exploitative, and disconnected from the Oriental community’s needs. The pervasive disdain for Labor is further fueled by the perceived neglect and exploitation of the Oriental Jewish working class, especially those in development towns and kibbutzim, leading to a dramatic shift in political allegiance towards Likud. The historical and ongoing neglect of these communities, coupled with their strategic settlement in vulnerable border areas, has left deep scars, contributing to a profound sense of abandonment and a rallying cry for revenge against the Labor establishment. This socio-political chasm is reflected in electoral violence and heightened anti-Ashkenazi sentiments, manifesting in extreme expressions of disaffection within the Oriental Jewish community.
Impoverished and unemployed Sephardic Jewish youth in Israeli towns like Kiryat Gat and Netivot near Gaza harbor intense hatred and violent attitudes towards Arabs. Their deep resentment stems from competition with Arab laborers over low-wage jobs, as well as broader ethnic/religious tensions. These marginalized Jewish youths idolize right-wing figures like Ariel Sharon and refer to Arabs using derogatory slurs. They blame Arabs for taking jobs at lower wages, leaving them unemployed, and resent Arabs having more economic means displayed through things like owning cars and going to movies. Open talk of exterminating or violently attacking Arabs, whom they view as lacking honor compared to Jews, is common. Phrases like “a good Arab is a dead Arab” are casually stated.
Isolated incidents of assaults on Arab workers by armed Jewish extremists occur but often go unreported, with threats of further violence if victims come forward. These xenophobic, violent attitudes are likely to intensify among Israel’s marginalized youth in the future, with trends like university student groups disrupting Arab social events with weapons and chains as an example of growing radicalization among the young. The disturbing attitudes and potential for violence against Arabs displayed by these disenfranchised Jewish groups is a concerning societal phenomenon rooted in economic insecurity and ethnic tensions within Israel itself.