The below sections will summarize chapters 4, 5, and 6 from Irrational Exuberance. The emergence and evolution of speculative bubbles in financial markets is intricately tied to the history and role of the news media. Speculative bubbles date back to the advent of newspapers, with early examples like the Dutch tulip mania of the 1630s suggesting that news media have always been integral to spreading ideas that shape collective behavior. Although often perceived as neutral observers, the media play an active role in market dynamics by shaping public attention and fostering widespread thinking patterns necessary for significant market events.
The media’s influence stems from their competitive need to attract and maintain public interest. Financial markets, particularly the stock market, provide a steady stream of newsworthy content due to their daily price fluctuations and perceived national significance. The media often cultivate debate and dramatize market activities, creating compelling narratives and emotional resonance that capture the public’s attention. They also amplify the star quality of the stock market, portraying it as a barometer of national health and a site of fortune-making.
Media coverage is instrumental in setting the stage for market moves. By framing market activities as part of an ongoing story, the media generate consistent engagement, akin to sports news. However, the coverage is not always substantive. Many market reports focus on short-term trends, often relying on superficial analysis or celebrity opinions that lack critical scrutiny. The emphasis on dramatic records or noteworthy price changes contributes to public confusion about the true state of the economy.
The interplay between news and market reactions is complex and often non-linear. Research suggests that major stock price changes frequently occur without clear connections to specific news events. For instance, Victor Niederhoffer’s analysis of significant headlines from 1950 to 1966 revealed only a marginal relationship between major news and large market movements, with crises being a somewhat more reliable predictor. Similarly, William Feltus’s survey of the 1989 UAL crash indicated that many investors only became aware of the “causal” news after the market decline had begun, suggesting a feedback loop rather than direct causation.
Historical examples underscore the nuanced role of news media in market crises. During the 1929 stock market crash, the media failed to identify any significant news directly tied to the collapse, instead focusing on past market movements and vague concerns about investor confidence. Similarly, in the 1987 crash, surveys revealed that investors primarily reacted to prior price declines rather than substantive economic news. The media’s tendency to evoke historical parallels, such as comparing the 1987 crash to 1929, likely heightened psychological feedback loops that exacerbated market declines.
The propagation of speculative bubbles through the media often involves attention cascades, where public focus shifts from one narrative to another in response to news events. For example, the delayed market reaction to the 1995 Kobe earthquake reflected not just the economic implications of the disaster but also the media’s role in amplifying fears and shifting attention to potential future crises.
Media coverage can also create and perpetuate fads among investors. The rise of portfolio insurance in the 1980s exemplifies how media attention can popularize specific strategies, influencing feedback mechanisms and market behavior. By providing a structured framework for responding to price changes, portfolio insurance altered investor reactions and contributed to the 1987 crash.
New Era Economic Thinking
New era economic thinking has often accompanied periods of stock market expansion, driven by the perception of a brighter, less uncertain future. The general trend over the twentieth century has indeed been toward higher living standards and reduced economic risks for individuals. However, the concept of a “new era” emerges intermittently, often as a reaction to market events rather than as a proactive narrative.
Historical analyses of new era thinking reveal that it frequently follows market booms, with economic commentators cautiously framing these periods as continuations of long-term trends rather than revolutionary shifts. For example, during the 1901 stock market peak, optimism revolved around technological progress, exemplified by the Pan-American Exposition’s Electric Tower and early concepts of electrification. Public belief in the benefits of corporate combinations also fueled confidence, although such optimism often ignored potential counterforces, like antitrust actions initiated under President Theodore Roosevelt.
The 1920s stock market boom was marked by rapid technological advancements, including the proliferation of automobiles, electrification, and radio. These innovations fueled widespread public enthusiasm, with commentators attributing the market’s ascent to the rise of mass production, installment credit, and industrial mechanization. However, optimism peaked in 1929, just before the Great Depression. Prominent voices like economist Irving Fisher misjudged the market’s sustainability, and the ensuing economic collapse undermined the era’s positive sentiment.
Similarly, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed surges of new era thinking. Postwar economic growth, low inflation, and the advent of television as a cultural unifier bolstered public confidence. Market milestones, such as the Dow approaching 1,000, captured the public imagination. Optimistic narratives linked prosperity to demographic factors, like the Baby Boom, and managerial innovations that purportedly stabilized the economy. However, the onset of stagflation in the 1970s shattered the new era narrative, as inflation and unemployment concurrently rose.
The 1990s bull market brought another wave of new era thinking, tied to globalization, technological innovation, and low inflation. Theories about economic stability and the decline of business cycle volatility gained prominence, echoing past narratives of a transformative economy. However, skepticism about speculative excesses was more visible, with media accounts frequently highlighting the risks of a bubble. This tempered optimism set the 1990s apart from earlier periods of euphoric confidence.
Despite their optimistic framing, new era narratives often overlook potential disruptions. Market booms drive the creation of such theories, but they seldom account for unforeseen societal, regulatory, or global shifts. Historical patterns reveal that new era thinking often ends not with sudden crashes but through gradual disillusionment, as economic realities expose the limitations of prevailing narratives.
Stock market bubbles and new era thinking are global phenomena, marked by exaggerated but temporary investor enthusiasm, often tied to perceptions of transformative economic shifts. These speculative bubbles are evidenced through dramatic stock price movements that frequently reverse over time.
Recent large-scale stock market events around the world illustrate this tendency. Data from 36 countries, spanning decades, reveal instances of extreme one-year and five-year price increases and decreases. Notable examples include the Philippines, which experienced a 683.4% one-year real price increase from December 1985 to December 1986 and a five-year increase of 1,253.2% from 1984 to 1989. These surges were linked to the fall of Ferdinand Marcos and renewed national optimism under Corazon Aquino. Similarly, Taiwan witnessed a speculative boom in 1986-87 with a 400.1% one-year price increase, driven by rapid economic growth and policy reforms, followed by a 74.9% decline in 1989-90.
Other examples highlight a mix of rational and irrational market dynamics. Venezuela’s 384.6% increase from 1990 to 1991 was linked to rising oil prices during the Gulf War, but this was followed by sharp declines. Peru’s stock market quadrupled in 1992-93 after the resolution of civil conflict and economic stabilization. However, stock price manipulations and speculative excess often contributed to unsustainable valuations, as seen in India’s “Mehta Peak” in 1992, which collapsed following financial scandals.
Historical data shows a tendency for dramatic price movements to reverse, particularly over five-year periods. For instance, 65% of countries with significant five-year price increases subsequently experienced declines, while 94% of those with five-year decreases saw recoveries. Reversals were less pronounced over shorter timeframes, reflecting the persistence of speculative fervor.
Major financial crises, like the Mexican and Asian crises, often coincided with or followed stock market collapses, highlighting complex interplays between speculative bubbles and external economic shocks. While global capital movements and improved market oversight may mitigate such volatility in the future, the persistence of speculative bubbles underscores the enduring influence of cultural and psychological factors on financial markets.
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