“The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity” by David Graeber and David Wengrow challenges conventional narratives about human history, particularly the origins of inequality. The authors argue that most of human history is unknown, and what is often discussed is based on simplifications like the narratives of Rousseau and Hobbes. Rousseau romanticized pre-agricultural societies as small, egalitarian bands living in innocence, which was lost with the advent of agriculture, leading to inequality, while Hobbes viewed human nature as inherently selfish, with civilization emerging to curb these instincts through government and social structures.
Graeber and Wengrow assert these views are not only incorrect but also politically and intellectually limiting. They introduce evidence from archaeology and anthropology suggesting that pre-agricultural societies were diverse and experimented with various social forms, not all of which were egalitarian or hierarchical. The emergence of agriculture and cities did not linearly lead to inequality. Instead, many early farming communities and cities were relatively egalitarian.
The book aims to build a new, more nuanced history that acknowledges this complexity and the contributions of indigenous societies to our understanding of human social evolution. This involves reevaluating the concept of social evolution itself, which has often been used to justify a linear, Eurocentric view of history. By considering a broader array of sources, including the perspectives of indigenous peoples, Graeber and Wengrow seek to open a dialogue about human history that is more inclusive and accurate, highlighting the agency of people in shaping their societies and challenging the notion that history is governed by immutable laws.
The Hobbesian and Rousseauian narratives of human history, by portraying humanity through a lens of innate selfishness or a fall from egalitarian innocence, respectively, carry profound political implications that limit the scope of conceivable social change. The Hobbesian view underpins our economic systems with the assumption of inherent human nastiness and selfishness, suggesting that societal progress relies on controlling these base instincts through sophisticated systems of governance and economic regulation. Rousseau’s narrative, while seemingly more optimistic, is often used to argue that although current societal structures are unjust, only modest reforms are achievable, thus precluding more radical transformations of society.
The discussion of inequality, especially post-2008 financial crisis, has become central in political and intellectual debates, suggesting a consensus that the gap between the rich and the poor is a primary source of societal issues. However, framing these problems as ‘inequality’ tends to encourage technocratic solutions rather than addressing underlying causes like the concentration of capital, oligopoly, or class power. ‘Inequality’ as a term invites half-measures and fails to challenge the power dynamics at the root of social disparities, implying that any solution would merely adjust the extent of inequality rather than eliminate its causes.
This framing effectively narrows the imagination regarding what is possible for human society, suggesting that significant social transformation is off the table. It reinforces a pessimistic view that genuine egalitarianism is unachievable in complex, modern societies, resigning us to the best-case scenario of slightly mitigating the degree of domination and exploitation within the existing system. The current fascination with measuring and debating inequality, while seemingly progressive, ultimately serves to maintain the status quo by obscuring the possibility of more fundamental changes to social organization and power structures.
Abandoning the myth of a universal past state of egalitarianism might be a step toward envisioning a more hopeful and dynamic understanding of human history. This would acknowledge humanity’s long tradition of experimenting with diverse forms of social organization and recognize our capacity for self-creation and freedom. Instead of lamenting the loss of an idyllic past, this perspective invites us to consider history as a series of experiments in living together, emphasizing our potential to collectively reimagine and reconstruct our social worlds.
The prevailing understandings of human history, particularly those rooted in Rousseau’s perspective, oversimplify the complexity of human societies and the origins of social inequality. These narratives often depict early human societies as simple, egalitarian bands of hunter-gatherers, disrupted by the advent of agriculture, which led to property ownership, hierarchy, and ultimately, inequality. This framing, echoed by thinkers like Francis Fukuyama and Jared Diamond, assumes a linear progression from small, equal groups to large, hierarchical states as inevitable, underpinned by the necessity of leadership and bureaucracy in larger populations.
However, this view is not supported by scientific evidence. There is no direct correlation between the scale of a society and its level of egalitarianism or the presence of hierarchy. The assumption that small societies are inherently egalitarian and large ones must have kings, presidents, or bureaucracies is a misconception, reflecting modern prejudices rather than historical facts.
Rousseau himself did not claim his portrayal of a state of nature leading to inequality through agriculture was a historical truth but rather a thought experiment to explore the paradox of human freedom leading to inequality. Similarly, Hobbes’s depiction of a natural state of war was not intended as a historical account but as a philosophical exploration of sovereignty and social order.
The repetition of these narratives, treating them as historical stages of human development, overlooks the diversity and complexity of human societies and their capacities for different forms of social organization. It constrains our understanding of history and humanity, reducing the rich tapestry of human existence to a simplistic and deterministic model that does not accurately reflect the evidence or the potential for human societies to organize in varied and complex ways.
Steven Pinker critiques Rousseau and Hobbes for their lack of empirical knowledge about pre-civilizational violence but paradoxically agrees with Hobbes’s grim view of human nature. Pinker argues that modern states, with their monopolies on legitimate violence, have significantly reduced violence compared to the anarchic past. He uses sensational examples, like Ötzi the Iceman, to illustrate prehistoric violence. However, this selective use of evidence overlooks examples of care and nurturing in pre-state societies, suggesting a more complex picture of human nature.
Pinker’s analysis aligns with a Hobbesian perspective, viewing the state’s formation as a move away from brutishness. However, this overlooks the diversity of social organizations and the evidence of cooperation and care in early human societies. The Yanomami, often cited as examples of innate human violence, actually have varied levels of violence and complex social structures that challenge simplistic views of human nature.
Pinker’s narrative also promotes a Eurocentric view of progress, attributing positive developments exclusively to Western civilization, while ignoring contributions from other cultures and oversimplifying the impact of European imperialism. His optimism about modernity and progress relies heavily on statistics, but the measurement of human happiness and the preference for different forms of social organization are complex and not easily quantified. The critique suggests that Pinker’s approach oversimplifies human history and nature, relying on selective evidence and a biased view of progress.
Empirical evidence challenges Pinker’s conclusions, showing people often prefer indigenous societies over Western civilization. Helena Valero, abducted by the Yanomami, chose to return to them after experiencing Western life, valuing the social bonds and quality of life over material wealth. Historical accounts reveal many such choices, emphasizing the appeal of freedom, social equality, and community support in indigenous societies. Benjamin Franklin noted the difficulty of reintegrating those who lived with Native Americans back into Western society, highlighting the stronger social bonds and quality of life they experienced. These narratives challenge the simplicity of Hobbesian and Rousseauian views, suggesting a richer, more complex human history that values social connections and happiness over material security.
The concept of “primitive trade” as evidence of innate capitalism is flawed, relying on circular logic and a lack of imagination about pre-market economies. Anthropological evidence, like the kula chain in Papua New Guinea, shows valuable objects can circulate across great distances for reasons other than trade, such as adventure, social relations, or fulfilling dreams. Examples from North America, including dream quests, travelling healers, and women’s gambling, further illustrate diverse motivations for long-distance exchange that do not resemble market trade. This book aims to present a new history of humankind, questioning assumptions about inequality and exploring the full range of human activities and social structures throughout history, suggesting a more complex and nuanced understanding of our past.
Rousseau’s narrative of social inequality as a departure from original innocence into complexity and enslavement echoes through history. However, the Enlightenment’s fascination with social inequality was spurred by Europe’s integration into a global economy, exposing European intellectuals to diverse ideas from around the world, challenging the notion that influential ideas only originate from “great thinkers” within Europe. This period saw Europeans adopt foreign ideas, including those from indigenous peoples, into their political thought, despite contemporary historians’ reluctance to acknowledge such influences. The question of social inequality’s origins, posed by the Académie de Dijon in 1754, reflects a broader engagement with and serious consideration of indigenous critiques of European society.
Indigenous critiques of European society highlighted European competitiveness, materialism, and lack of freedom and generosity, contrasting it with indigenous values of communal support, eloquence, and a less materialistic lifestyle. These critiques challenged European views on civilization and progress, influencing Enlightenment debates on liberty, equality, and human nature by presenting alternative models of societal organization based on freedom and communal well-being.
Indigenous Americans and Europeans agreed that indigenous societies were generally freer, but they differed on the desirability of individual liberty. Seventeenth-century European views on freedom, sexual mores, and social equality were far removed from modern liberal democratic ideals, often closer to indigenous perspectives. Jesuits saw individual liberty as almost animalistic, contrasting with indigenous views that Europeans lived in fear and subjection. Indigenous justice systems, focusing on communal responsibility and compensation rather than punishment, were effective and maintained peace without coercion. This challenged European notions, illustrating that freedom and communal well-being could coexist without leading to disorder. Indigenous attitudes towards personal freedom, control over one’s body, and the rejection of arbitrary power offered a radical alternative to European hierarchical and coercive systems, influencing the development of European political thought towards valuing liberty and reasoned debate.
The text explores the foundational role of freedom and equality in indigenous American societies, contrasting sharply with European views prior to and during the Enlightenment. Indigenous Americans valued individual liberty and equality not in terms of subjugation to laws or sovereigns but as the inherent right to choose whether to follow communal decisions. Their societies were characterized by a form of democracy that necessitated consensus and reasoned debate, a stark difference from European hierarchical structures.
European missionaries and travelers, despite their initial intentions to convert indigenous peoples, found themselves impressed and often challenged by the sophisticated rhetorical skills and political philosophies of the indigenous populations. This exposure led to a mutual but complex influence, where indigenous concepts of freedom, communal responsibility, and justice began to seep into European thought, challenging existing notions of authority, governance, and social structure.
The dialogue between the two worlds revealed a deep respect for personal autonomy within indigenous communities, where leadership was based on persuasion rather than coercion, and social cohesion was maintained through mutual aid and respect for individual decisions. This system was supported by a baseline communism, ensuring that basic human needs were met for all, further emphasizing the communal support for individual freedom.
As Europeans grappled with these encounters, they began to integrate these ideals into their own philosophical and political frameworks, contributing to the evolving discourse on liberty, equality, and democracy. This process highlighted the contrast between indigenous American practices of freedom and European systems of control, eventually influencing the development of Enlightenment thought and democratic ideals in Europe, shifting the conversation towards a more inclusive understanding of equality and individual rights.
The narrative explores the profound influence of Native American thought on European intellectual discourse, focusing on the interactions between a Wendat philosopher named Kandiaronk and a European noble, Baron de Lahontan. Kandiaronk, renowned for his eloquence and analytical prowess, offered a piercing critique of European societal norms, critiquing the concepts of money, property ownership, and hierarchical social structures. Through conversations facilitated by Lahontan, Kandiaronk eloquently challenged European practices, beliefs, and governance, advocating for a worldview that valued communal well-being over individual accumulation of wealth.
His critiques, deeply rooted in Native American values, highlighted the contrast between European societies driven by competition and accumulation, and Native American communities centered on cooperation and shared prosperity. Kandiaronk’s skepticism towards European religious and legal systems underscored his argument that the pursuit of material wealth led to societal discord and inequality. These dialogues not only shed light on the wisdom inherent in Native American philosophical views but also contributed to the evolving debates on freedom, equality, and human nature within the European Enlightenment. By emphasizing the importance of community and questioning the accumulation of power, Kandiaronk’s insights offered a critical perspective that resonated with key Enlightenment ideals, representing a significant cross-cultural intellectual contribution.
Kandiaronk argues against European societal norms, emphasizing that abandoning the concepts of “mine” and “thine” would lead to equality, as seen among the Wendat. Initially, Europe might face desolation as those unfit for communal living perish, but future generations would thrive under a communal system. His critique becomes a part of European intellectual discourse, inspiring Enlightenment figures to adopt and expand on his themes, leading to a broader critique of European society through the lens of the “noble savage.” The concept of schismogenesis explains the exaggeration of differences between societies, further fueling these critiques. Lahontan’s dialogues with Kandiaronk, despite being seen as romanticized, had a significant impact on European thought, challenging prevailing notions of civilization and sparking debates on freedom, equality, and the structure of society.
Theories of social evolution emerged in Europe as a response to indigenous critiques, reshaping European perceptions of indigenous societies and placing them at the bottom of an evolutionary hierarchy. This shift marked a transformation in European thought, from engaging with indigenous critiques on freedom and equality to framing these societies as primitive ancestors. The discourse evolved, with Enlightenment figures utilizing indigenous critiques to challenge European authority and societal structures, eventually leading to debates on the very concepts of civilization, progress, and the role of private property in societal inequality. Rousseau’s work, influenced by these debates and indigenous perspectives, critically examined the origins of social inequality, linking it to the emergence of property relations and questioning the moral decline associated with civilization’s progress. This intellectual journey reflects a complex engagement with indigenous critiques, leading to foundational changes in European thought and the conceptualization of social evolution.
Rousseau’s work, indirectly influenced by indigenous critiques and Jesuit accounts, questioned European societal norms, including competitiveness, lack of communal support, and hierarchical obedience. His concept of “pitié,” or natural sympathy among “savages,” contrasted sharply with European individualism and property rights. Rousseau’s success lay in blending indigenous criticisms with European notions of progress and property, highlighting the contradictions between communal liberty and private ownership. He portrayed a society where individual freedom is inherently linked to communal sharing, a stark contrast to the European model where freedom is tied to property rights. Rousseau’s speculative history of humanity’s fall from a state of nature into societal chains due to property division underscores the loss of communal liberty. His influence, controversial for its radical implications, marks a foundational moment in left-wing thought, challenging traditional notions of progress and property. This intellectual trajectory, criticized by conservatives, underscores a deep historical debate on freedom, equality, and societal organization, rooted in the indigenous critique of European societal structures.
Rousseau, influenced by the indigenous critique and Jesuit writings, attributed societal evils to property ownership, echoing the sentiments of his predecessors. Critics like Chinard saw such ideas as dangerously subversive, accusing Rousseau and the Jesuits of fostering revolutionary thoughts contrary to monarchical and religious interests. This critique reflects a broader skepticism towards the indigenous perspectives, deemed too alien for meaningful engagement, thus sidelining the complex views of indigenous peoples under a veil of romanticization or outright dismissal.
The debate around the concept of ‘egalitarianism’ in historical and anthropological discourse reveals its complexities and the difficulties in defining and applying it across societies. The term often obscures more than it clarifies, failing to capture the nuanced understandings of equality, freedom, and dignity that vary significantly among cultures and historical contexts. The simplistic binary of ‘egalitarian’ versus ‘non-egalitarian’ societies overlooks the intricate ways in which people have organized themselves and their values, often reflecting a projection of Western analytical frameworks rather than a genuine engagement with the diversity of human social arrangements.
The book aims to reexamine the origins of social inequalities by moving beyond conventional narratives and exploring the conditions that allowed for the emergence of hierarchical structures. It seeks to understand how certain forms of social organization, which diverge significantly from the assumed ‘egalitarian’ baseline, came into being. By drawing on indigenous critiques and reconsidering the evidence with fresh perspectives, the authors strive to unpack the complex processes that led to the current global disparities in power and wealth, challenging the reader to rethink deeply held assumptions about civilization, progress, and social organization.