From The Dichotomy of the Self. This week, Chapter 9, “The Ego Illusion”: how people deceive themselves, and what the word “self” can and cannot carry.
You are writing in a crowded café. Most of the noise around you stays outside your attention until a familiar voice cuts through it, and then you notice at once. That kind of selection is how anyone concentrates, and there is nothing dishonest in it.
Self-deception looks like a contradiction. If you know the truth, how can you be deceived? If you don’t know it, in what sense are you deceiving yourself? Herbert Fingarette’s book Self-Deception answers without needing a tiny conspirator inside the mind who prepares lies for another tiny person to believe. He looks at the ways a person avoids spelling out something that is already part of their life. Attention is a useful comparison, though not a full explanation. The trouble starts when a habit of looking away protects a preferred story against evidence that deserves a hearing.
The chapter gives a hypothetical case. Someone says a project is their deepest commitment, yet keeps avoiding its actual work while enjoying the identity that comes with it. Exhaustion, fear, competing demands or a loss of interest could each explain that. Self-deception becomes possible when they refuse to look into those explanations because the identity must stay untouched. Nobody decides to lie. The flattering idea stays available, and its awkward implications stay vague. You cannot read another person’s motives from delay alone, but you can put the question to yourself.
Does a lie you tell yourself stay private? It doesn’t. Dostoevsky’s warning about lying to yourself is severe, the chapter says, because the cost goes beyond one wrong belief. A person can lose the ability to take the truth from other people, and then come to resent the people whose existence makes the false story hard to keep up.
Then there is the self that is supposed to be doing all this. The word covers at least five things: the body, the experience of being a subject, a remembered life story, a social identity and an imagined inner controller. An argument against one of them does not abolish the others.
If your professional identity is constructed, it does not follow that you do not exist. If your thoughts arise without your full control, it does not follow that thinking is unreal. Your heart does not take orders from you either, and it is still yours. Control, ownership, identification and existence are four different questions.
What, then, does the evidence make hard to believe in? One particular picture: a fixed, independent authority standing behind experience, writing all of it and untouched by the processes it directs.
The chapter offers three questions. Can you look at the evidence without requiring it to protect the person you prefer to be? Can you tell a reason from the need to have a reason? Can you admit that something which once mattered no longer holds the same place in your life? None of them makes self-deception impossible. But they make it somewhat harder for a convenient story to go unchallenged.