*Mimesis and Science, *edited by Scott R. Garrels, brings together some of the best scholar of Girard’s mimetic theory, with leading imitation researchers from the cognitive, developmental, and neuro sciences
In the science of man and culture today there is a unilateral swerve away from anything that could be called mimicry, imitation, or mimesis. And yet there is nothing, or next to nothing, in human behavior that is not learned, and all learning is based on imitation. If human beings suddenly ceased imitating, all forms of culture would vanish… To develop a science of man it is necessary to compare human imitation with animal mimicry, and to specify the properly human modalities of mimetic behavior, if they indeed exist.—René Girard,Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World
Far from being the simple and mindless act that we typically associate it with (“monkey see, monkey do”), imitation is now understood as a complex, generative, and multidimensional phenomenon at the heart of what makes us human. In fact, imitation may very well be the basis for not only how we learn, but also how we understand each other’s intentions and desires, establish relational bonds, fall in love, become jealous, compete with one another, and violently destroy each other, all the while operating largely outside of our conscious awareness.
As a result of his extensive writing and research over the last 50 years, it is “clear to a wide range of scholars that Girard is one of the most original and influential cultural theorists on the contemporary scene.”
History of Imitation
One would think that if imitation were so vital and important to human life, then it would be evident and known in some ways by the experiences and observations of it throughout history. Indeed, imitation has been central to philosophical discourse since the foundation of Western civilization. The issue at hand is not so much that imitation has been unrecognized, but rather the way in which it has been treated and emphasized during different periods of history, including important dimensions that, until recently, have been overlooked
Plato and Aristotle were the first to treat the subject of mimesis (the Greek word for imitation) at length, with each representing opposing attitudes that would prove influential throughout history, including up to the present day.
Plato’s ideas are considered a primary source of our modern tendency to devalue imitation. In Plato’s system of thought, all elements of matter in the created world were a mere shadow, or imitation, of their absolute Form in the nonmaterial realm of the Good.
In his pursuit of objective truth and ethical grounds for the moral life, Plato believed that reason alone was capable of perceiving directly these most absolute forms of reality. On the other hand, knowledge based on mimesis in the arts was considered a devalued form of the truth since it was based on a twice-removed imitation of reality (e.g., the artist’s painting of a table was a copy of the material object, which itself was a copy of the absolute form).
This “mimetic tradition” was not only applied to the arts, but was also the basis for continued advancement and reform in religious, historical, and philosophical traditions. Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ in the fifteenth century is a classic example of the positive attitude toward imitation that was widely evident throughout this period.
The Autonomous Self
In effect, in contrast to our modern notion of limiting growth, or mere conformity, imitation was seen as a primary means of social and cultural progress throughout this long period of human history. “Undoubtedly the change in attitude in modern times has made more difficult our understanding of imitation and our capacity to perceive its benefits and its ties to Renaissance inventiveness.”
It is therefore ironic that the figure who would become known as the quintessential “Renaissance Man” was also the one most opposed to the mimetic tradition. According to Ackerman, “Leonardo da Vinci was the only writer who disapproved of all imitation in the classical sense.
He wrote of it: ‘No one should ever imitate the maniera of another because he will be called a nephew and not a child of nature with regard to art. Because things in nature exist in such abundance, we need and we ought rather to have recourse to nature than to those masters who have learned from her.’”
It is hard to imagine, however, that Da Vinci was not significantly influenced by others in the development of his art, and even more difficult to imagine, given his substantial influence, that subsequent artists did not then imitate him in his dictate to not imitate! Indeed, the generation following Da Vinci would witness a virtual end of the mimetic tradition.14 The attempt to rely primarily on oneself, and therefore deny imitation, would find its fullest expression in modern philosophy.
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Self vs group
Philosophy
In many ways, Descartes’s position reified Plato’s dualistic view of reality that presumed rational thought could be separated out from the influence of mimesis and emotions. This “Cartesian split” between perception/emotion and thought/behavior brought with it the erroneous belief that each individual could consciously ward off all human passions and social influences in the pursuit of a more objective truth
In effect, Descartes implicitly denied that imitation was an essential and ongoing feature of human cognition, motivation, and behavior. In doing so, he was influential in setting up a longstanding dichotomy in the cognitive and social sciences between perception and action systems.18 Not only that, but the concept of imitation, or mimesis, itself seemed all but explained away or devalued as an important idea worth continued philosophical exploration.
Clearly, the origins and development of modern philosophy are complex and extend far beyond the writings and influence of Descartes, including the fact that many notable philosophers in the modern period did not reflect the Enlightenment spirit.21 Nonetheless, it is difficult to overestimate the overall effect that the Enlightenment tradition had on modern philosophy and the history of Western thought for over the last four hundred years. The social sciences and medical models developed during this time were so influenced by an autonomous view of the human mind and person, that only in the past 50 years have we begun to make incremental shifts in our conceptual paradigms, allowing for more diverse perspectives across a wide range of disciplines.2
Birth of Psychology
The end of the nineteenth century is generally considered the period when the discipline of psychology was born as a separate branch of the sciences.
Despite the clear dominance of Enlightenment thinking at the time, interest in imitation was revived for a short period, and even viewed by several prominent thinkers as the defining human characteristic. However, by the turn of the century, this emphasis would all but disappear as imitation was substantially marginalized by the most influential theories of modern psychology.
The Laws of Imitation
The French social psychologist Gabriel Tarde is perhaps the most notable imitation theorist of this early period in modern psychology. In 1890, Tarde published his Laws of Imitation, where he defines imitation as constituting “every impression of an inter-psychical photography, so to speak, willed or not willed, passive or active
If we observe that wherever there is a social relation between two living beings, there we have imitation in this sense of the word.”
For Tarde, imitation was the essential “social fact” to which all other social processes, including the most complex and innovative forms of behavior, ideas, and culture, could be related. As a result, Tarde’s views on imitation directly challenged the idea of an autonomous self. According to Tarde, “We err in flattering ourselves that we have become less credulous and docile, less imitative, in short, than our ancestors. This is a fallacy, and we shall have to rid ourselves of it.”
As a result of the work of Tarde, as well as many other notable authors, the subject of imitation was widely discussed and debated by the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in connection with such phenomena as hypnosis, unconscious suggestion, and crowd behavior.
William James
In the same year as Tarde’s Laws of Imitation, the American psychologist William James published his classic two-volume text Principles of Psychology. In this work, James classifies imitation as an instinctual behavior operating early in infancy and essential to what is definitively human. While imitation was not a primary focus of his work, his brief treatment of the subject is nonetheless worth mentioning given his founding influence in the field of psychology. James begins by noting that imitation of facial gestures may begin in childhood as early as 15 weeks. He then elaborates:
And from this time onward man is essentially the imitative animal. His whole civilization depends on this trait, which his strong tendencies to rivalry, jealousy, and acquisitiveness reinforce. ‘Nil humani a me alienum puto,’ is the motto of each individual of the species; and makes him, whenever another individual shows a power or superiority of any kind, restless until he can exhibit it himself. But apart from this kind of imitation, of which the psychological roots are complex, there is the more direct propensity to speak and walk and behave like others, usually without any conscious intention of so doing. And there is the imitative tendency which shows itself in large masses of men, and produces panics, and orgies, and frenzies of violence, and which only the rarest individuals can actively withstand.
The nature and importance that James ascribes to imitation is remarkable.
However, despite his emphatic treatment of the subject, he did not spend much time developing his initial insights, especially concerning the relationship between imitation, rivalry, jealousy, and acquisitiveness.
By the end of the nineteenth century, for reasons that are not altogether clear, imitation as a central concept was substantially marginalized by the most influential psychological theories as they began to emerge in the twentieth century. This profound neglect is exemplified by the absence of imitation in the development of Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. Certainly, the magnitude and influence of Freud’s thought in the twentieth century cannot be overstated, both in the realm of the social sciences and popular culture.
It is therefore significant that Freud rarely mentions the function of imitation directly in his many papers and books
Sigmund Freud
From a developmental perspective, “There is no place in Freud’s theory of early infancy for imitative self-other reciprocity (primary intersubjectivity).”29 While his initial theory and treatment approach relied heavily on social influences and incorporated the function of suggestion and hypnosis—developments that were influenced by imitation theorists such as Tarde at the turn of the century—he ultimately abandoned this work in favor of his libidinal theory.
In doing so, Freud adhered to an autonomous view of the self that was confined to biological drives and instinctual formulations—a view that he staunchly held until the end of his life. His many followers similarly rejected imitation as a fundamental capacity central to human development and psychological organization
Skinner – Piaget
Like psychoanalysis, learning theories that predominated in the twentieth century—from Skinner’s behaviorism to Piaget’s cognitive theories of development—assumed that imitation was not an inna