“The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity” by David Graeber and David Wengrow challenges conventional narratives about human history, particularly the origins of inequality. The authors argue that most of human history is unknown, and what is often discussed is based on simplifications like the narratives of Rousseau and Hobbes. Rousseau romanticized pre-agricultural societies as small, egalitarian bands living in innocence, which was lost with the advent of agriculture, leading to inequality, while Hobbes viewed human nature as inherently selfish, with civilization emerging to curb these instincts through government and social structures.
Graeber and Wengrow assert these views are not only incorrect but also politically and intellectually limiting. They introduce evidence from archaeology and anthropology suggesting that pre-agricultural societies were diverse and experimented with various social forms, not all of which were egalitarian or hierarchical. The emergence of agriculture and cities did not linearly lead to inequality. Instead, many early farming communities and cities were relatively egalitarian.
The book aims to build a new, more nuanced history that acknowledges this complexity and the contributions of indigenous societies to our understanding of human social evolution. This involves reevaluating the concept of social evolution itself, which has often been used to justify a linear, Eurocentric view of history. By considering a broader array of sources, including the perspectives of indigenous peoples, Graeber and Wengrow seek to open a dialogue about human history that is more inclusive and accurate, highlighting the agency of people in shaping their societies and challenging the notion that history is governed by immutable laws.
The Hobbesian and Rousseauian narratives of human history, by portraying humanity through a lens of innate selfishness or a fall from egalitarian innocence, respectively, carry profound political implications that limit the scope of conceivable social change. The Hobbesian view underpins our economic systems with the assumption of inherent human nastiness and selfishness, suggesting that societal progress relies on controlling these base instincts through sophisticated systems of governance and economic regulation. Rousseau’s narrative, while seemingly more optimistic, is often used to argue that although current societal structures are unjust, only modest reforms are achievable, thus precluding more radical transformations of society.
The discussion of inequality, especially post-2008 financial crisis, has become central in political and intellectual debates, suggesting a consensus that the gap between the rich and the poor is a primary source of societal issues. However, framing these problems as ‘inequality’ tends to encourage technocratic solutions rather than addressing underlying causes like the concentration of capital, oligopoly, or class power. ‘Inequality’ as a term invites half-measures and fails to challenge the power dynamics at the root of social disparities, implying that any solution would merely adjust the extent of inequality rather than eliminate its causes.
This framing effectively narrows the imagination regarding what is possible for human society, suggesting that significant social transformation is off the table. It reinforces a pessimistic view that genuine egalitarianism is unachievable in complex, modern societies, resigning us to the best-case scenario of slightly mitigating the degree of domination and exploitation within the existing system. The current fascination with measuring and debating inequality, while seemingly progressive, ultimately serves to maintain the status quo by obscuring the possibility of more fundamental changes to social organization and power structures.
Abandoning the myth of a universal past state of egalitarianism might be a step toward envisioning a more hopeful and dynamic understanding of human history. This would acknowledge humanity’s long tradition of experimenting with diverse forms of social organization and recognize our capacity for self-creation and freedom. Instead of lamenting the loss of an idyllic past, this perspective invites us to consider history as a series of experiments in living together, emphasizing our potential to collectively reimagine and reconstruct our social worlds.
The prevailing understandings of human history, particularly those rooted in Rousseau’s perspective, oversimplify the complexity of human societies and the origins of social inequality. These narratives often depict early human societies as simple, egalitarian bands of hunter-gatherers, disrupted by the advent of agriculture, which led to property ownership, hierarchy, and ultimately, inequality. This framing, echoed by thinkers like Francis Fukuyama and Jared Diamond, assumes a linear progression from small, equal groups to large, hierarchical states as inevitable, underpinned by the necessity of leadership and bureaucracy in larger populations.
However, this view is not supported by scientific evidence. There is no direct correlation between the scale of a society and its level of egalitarianism or the presence of hierarchy. The assumption that small societies are inherently egalitarian and large ones must have kings, presidents, or bureaucracies is a misconception, reflecting modern prejudices rather than historical facts.
Rousseau himself did not claim his portrayal of a state of nature leading to inequality through agriculture was a historical truth but rather a thought experiment to explore the paradox of human freedom leading to inequality. Similarly, Hobbes’s depiction of a natural state of war was not intended as a historical account but as a philosophical exploration of sovereignty and social order.
The repetition of these narratives, treating them as historical stages of human development, overlooks the diversity and complexity of human societies and their capacities for different forms of social organization. It constrains our understanding of history and humanity, reducing the rich tapestry of human existence to a simplistic and deterministic model that does not accurately reflect the evidence or the potential for human societies to organize in varied and complex ways.
Steven Pinker critiques Rousseau and Hobbes for their lack of empirical knowledge about pre-civilizational violence but paradoxically agrees with Hobbes’s grim view of human nature. Pinker argues that modern states, with their monopolies on legitimate violence, have significantly reduced violence compared to the anarchic past. He uses sensational examples, like Ötzi the Iceman, to illustrate prehistoric violence. However, this selective use of evidence overlooks examples of care and nurturing in pre-state societies, suggesting a more complex picture of human nature.
Pinker’s analysis aligns with a Hobbesian perspective, viewing the state’s formation as a move away from brutishness. However, this overlooks the diversity of social organizations and the evidence of cooperation and care in early human societies. The Yanomami, often cited as examples of innate human violence, actually have varied levels of violence and complex social structures that challenge simplistic views of human nature.
Pinker’s narrative also promotes a Eurocentric view of progress, attributing positive developments exclusively to Western civilization, while ignoring contributions from other cultures and oversimplifying the impact of European imperialism. His optimism about modernity and progress relies heavily on statistics, but the measurement of human happiness and the preference for different forms of social organization are complex and not easily quantified. The critique suggests that Pinker’s approach oversimplifies human history and nature, relying on selective evidence and a biased view of progress.
Empirical evidence challenges Pinker’s conclusions, showing people often prefer indigenous societies over Western civilization. Helena Valero, abducted by the Yanomami, chose to return to them after experiencing Western life, valuing the social bonds and quality of life over material wealth. Historical accounts reveal many such choices, emphasizing the appeal of freedom, social equality, and community support in indigenous societies. Benjamin Franklin noted the difficulty of reintegrating those who lived with Native Americans back into Western society, highlighting the stronger social bonds and quality of life they experienced. These narratives challenge the simplicity of Hobbesian and Rousseauian views, suggesting a richer, more complex human history that values social connections and happiness over material security.
The concept of “primitive trade” as evidence of innate capitalism is flawed, relying on circular logic and a lack of imagination about pre-market economies. Anthropological evidence, like the kula chain in Papua New Guinea, shows valuable objects can circulate across great distances for reasons other than trade, such as adventure, social relations, or fulfilling dreams. Examples from North America, including dream quests, travelling healers, and women’s gambling, further illustrate diverse motivations for long-distance exchange that do not resemble market trade. This book aims to present a new history of humankind, questioning assumptions about inequality and exploring the full range of human activities and social structures throughout history, suggesting a more complex and nuanced understanding of our past.
Rousseau’s narrative of social inequality as a departure from original innocence into complexity and enslavement echoes through history. However, the Enlightenment’s fascination with social inequality was spurred by Europe’s integration into a global economy, exposing European intellectuals to diverse ideas from around the world, challenging the notion that influential ideas only originate from “great thinkers” within Europe. This period saw Europeans adopt foreign ideas, including those from indigenous peoples, into their political thought, despite contemporary historians’ reluctance to acknowledge such influences. The question of social inequality’s origins, posed by the Académie de Dijon in 1754, reflects a broader engagement with and serious consideration of indigenous critiques of European society.
Indigenous critiques of European society highlighted European competitiveness, materialism, and lack of freedom and generosity, contrasting it with indigenous values of communal support, eloquence, and a less materialistic lifestyle. These critiques challenged European views on civilization and progress, influencing Enlightenment debates on liberty, equality, and human nature by presenting alternative models of societal organization based on freedom and communal well-being.
Indigenous Americans and Europeans agreed that indigenous societies were generally freer, but they differed on the desirability of individual liberty. Seventeenth-century European views on freedom, sexual mores, and social equality were far removed from modern liberal democratic ideals, often closer to indigenous perspectives. Jesuits saw individual liberty as almost animalistic, contrasting with indigenous views that Europeans lived in fear and subjection. Indigenous justice systems, focusing on communal responsibility and compensation rather than punishment, were effective and maintained peace without coercion. This challenged European notions, illustrating that freedom and communal well-being could coexist without leading to disorder. Indigenous attitudes towards personal freedom, control over one’s body, and the rejection of arbitrary power offered a radical alternative to European hierarchical and coercive systems, influencing the development of European political thought towards valuing liberty and reasoned debate.
The text explores the foundational role of freedom and equality in indigenous American societies, co